The Mauritius Privy Council Reports: August 1988

Friday, 19 August 1988

Sattar Buxoo v The Queen

Sattar Buxoo and Another

Appellants

The Queen

Respondent

Appeal from the Supreme Court of Mauritius

Composition of the Board:

Lord Keith of Kinkel

Lord Brandon of Oakbrook

Lord Griffiths

Judgment delivered on the 19th May 1988

by Lord Keith of Kinkel

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(1) Constitutional law - Power of Mauritius Parliament to legislate on Privy Council jurisdiction

(2) Criminal law - Privy Council jurisdiction in criminal matters - Not a court of fact - Important point of law has to be raised in appeal

(3) Mauritian law - Interpretation of Act of Parliament - French tradition - Travaux préparatoires

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Cases referred to in judgment

Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Sham Chuen [1986] A.C. 887

Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Tse Hung Lit [1986] A.C. 876

Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Wong Muk Ping [1987] A.C. 501

Badry v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1983] 2 A.C. 297

Ex parte Deeming [1892] A.C. 422

Holder v. The Queen [1980] A.C. 115

Ibrahim v. The King [1914] A.C. 599

Oteri v. The Queen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1272

Re Dillet (1887) 12 App.Cas. 459

Regina v. Bertrand (1867) L.R. 1 P.C. 520

Reil v. The Queen (1885) 10 App.Cas. 675

Legislations referred to in judgment

Constitution of Mauritius, section 81

Courts (Amendment) Act 1980, section 7

Courts Act 1945, section 70A

Criminal Code, section 228

Other authorities referred to in judgment

Fourth Legislative Assembly Debates, Fourth Session, 26 June 1980, Col. 3298

Privy Council Practice Direction by Viscount Dunedin [1932] 48 T.L.R. 300

The following judgment was delivered by the Board:

On the 5th December 1985 the appellants were convicted by the Intermediate Court of Mauritius on a charge of having wilfully and criminally inflicted wounds and blows upon one Fockeena which incapacitated him from personal labour for more than 20 days, contrary to section 228(1) of the Criminal Code. They were each sentenced to 18 months imprisonment with hard labour. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Mauritius was dismissed on 18th August 1986. The appellants now appeal to Her Majesty in Council under section 70A of the Courts Act. That section, which was added to the Act by section 7 of the Courts (Amendment) Act 1980, provides :-

"(1) Notwithstanding any other enactment an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeal to Her Majesty in Council as of right in all criminal cases."

It is to be observed that section 81(1) of the Constitution of Mauritius, dealing with appeals as of right to Her Majesty in Council from decisions of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, specifies in paragraphs (a), (b) and(c) certain categories of cases in which such appeal is to lie. The final paragraph, (d), adds "in such other cases as may be prescribed by Parliament".

At the outset of his argument counsel for the appellants raised a question as to the scope of the appeal to Her Majesty in Council in criminal cases now available as of right by virtue of section 70A of the Courts Act. Until that enactment no appeal from any court in any jurisdiction lay to Her Majesty in Council as of right in criminal cases. Such an appeal might be presented only with special leave granted by Her Majesty on the advice of the Board, and that is still the position in respect of all the other courts appeals from which Her Majesty in Council has jurisdiction to entertain. (See Oteri v. The Queen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1272 and Holder v. The Queen [1980] A.C. 115). Special leave is traditionally granted only in exceptional circumstances, where the Board find room for the view that a really serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred. The question which arises is whether a similar principle is to be applied in the disposal of appeals as of right under section 70A of the Mauritius Courts Act, or whether the Board is to consider on a broad basis whether the conviction appealed against is bad by reason of misdirection or wrongful admission or rejection of evidence, or is unsafe or unsatisfactory in the light of the evidence led.

In the first appeal coming before the Board under section 70A, Badry v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1983] 2 A.C. 297, the traditional principle was held to apply. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. said at p. 302-303:-

"... since this appeal may be the first to be heard under the legislation (Courts (Amendment) Act 1980, section 7) extending the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee in appeals from Mauritius, their Lordships feel it right to reiterate the general principles on which they will continue to feel bound to tender their advice in criminal matters.

The locus classicus in which these principles are stated are the passages in the opinion of the Board given by Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. The King [1914] A.C. 599, 614-615, where he said:

"Their Lordships' practice has been repeatedly defined. Leave to appeal is not granted 'except where some clear departure from the requirements of justice' exists: Reil v. The Queen (1885) 10 App.Cas. 675, 677: nor unless 'by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done': In re Dillet (1887) 12 App.Cas. 459, 467. It is true that these are cases of applications for special leave to appeal, but the Board has repeatedly treated applications for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals as being upon the same footing: Reil's case, (1885) 10 App.Cas. 675; Ex parte Deeming [1892] A.C. 422. The Board cannot give leave to appeal where the grounds suggested could not sustain the appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the grant of permission to bring it. Misdirection, as such, event irregularity as such, will not suffice: Ex parte Macrea [1893] A.C. 346. There must be something which, in the particular case, deprives the accused of the substance of fair trial and the protection of the law, or which, in general, tends to divert the due and orderly administration of the law into a new course, which may be drawn into an evil precedent in future: Regina v. Bertrand (1867) L.R. 1 P.C. 520."

By these words their Lordships, notwithstanding any new legislation in the territories of the Commonwealth from which appeals may be brought in criminal matters, continue to feel themselves bound and, in the instant appeals, their Lordships consider that they have been guided by them. Their Lordships also desire to repeat the practice direction, issued by Viscount Dunedin [1932] 48 T.L.R. 300:

"'Their Lordships have repeated ad nauseam the statement that they do not sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal. For them to interfere with a criminal sentence there must be something so irregular or so outrageous as to shake the very basis of justice. Such an instance was found in In re Dillet (1887) 12 App.Cas. 459 which has all long along been held to be the leading authority in such matters. In the present case" - an Indian petition for special leave to appeal against a conviction and sentence of death for murder - "the only real point is a point for argument on a section of a statute, and all that the petitioner can say is that it was wrongly decided. That is to ask the Board to sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal and nothing else.'

In all that their Lordships say hereafter in discussing the merits of the instant consolidated appeals, their Lordships believe that they remain bound by, and have stayed within, the confines of these precepts."

Counsel for the appellants pointed out that, in so far as appears from the report of the case, no argument had been directed in Badry v. Director of Public Prosecutions to the scope of the appeal or the principles to be applied in the disposal of it, and he submitted that the matter should be reconsidered. He drew attention to the terms in which the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice had presented the proposed enactment of section 70A to the Mauritian Parliament as indicative of an intention that the scope of the appeal should be as wide as was the case in civil appeals which lay as of right. (Fourth Legislative Assembly Debates, Fourth Session, 26 June 1980 col. 3298). It appears that in Mauritius, where a large part of the law is derived from that of France, travaux préparatoires are readily resorted to as an aid to the true construction of legislation. That is not a practice which their Lordships would readily say anything to discourage. The reference does not, however, indicate any intention on the part of the legislature to dictate to the Board the principles which are to be applied in the disposal of appeals under the enactment. If the enactment had specifically purported to do this, for example by specifying the grounds upon which an appeal might be allowed, then a serious question would have arisen as to whether the Board were bound to give effect to the enactment, in so far as it purported to bring about a departure from the traditional principles. Section 70A of the Courts Act does not purport to do that, and the statement of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice cannot reasonably be construed as capable of importing such an intention into the section by implication. In the circumstances the question does not arise for decision, but the Board would not easily be persuaded that their function of tendering advice to Her Majesty was capable of being fettered by the legislature of any of the countries where the jurisdiction of Her Majesty in Council is accepted.

The Board will accordingly continue to hold themselves bound, in relation to criminal appeals from Mauritius, by the principles set out in Badry v. Director of Public Prosecutions. It is to be remarked, however, that these principles are not necessarily to be applied with the most extreme rigidity. Where an important point of law of general application is raised by an appeal, and the decision in question is capable, if not reversed, of constituting a precedent not conducive to the public interest in the proper administration of justice, the appeal may be capable of being accommodated within the intendment of the principles. Thus the Board have on occasion granted special leave to an appeal to a prosecutor. Recent instances are Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Tse Hung Lit [1986] A.C. 876, Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Sham Chuen [1986] A.C. 887 and Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Wong Muk Ping [1987] A.C. 501.

In the present case, however, it is plain that the circumstances of the appeal take it far outside any possible application of the principles in question. No point of law is involved. The only issue before the Intermediate Court and the Supreme Court was whether on the evidence led the appellants had been identified as being among the persons who carried out the serious assault which undoubtedly perpetrated on the victim Fockeena. The Intermediate Court found that they had been and the finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Board could never consider it right to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact of that nature.

Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.

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FOREWORD and/et AVANT-PROPOS

CONTENTS/SOMMAIRE

(bilingual/bilingue)

FOREWORD

(in English/en anglais)

AVANT-PROPOS

(in French/en français)

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FOREWORD TO THE ONLINE VERSION

At the time of the launching of an on-line version of the « Mauritius Privy Council Reports » (the « MPCR »), it appears necessary to say a few words regarding the intention that presided over its publication.

The work was conceived initially in printed and bound forms and began in 1996 in London. A first volume was published in 1999 (volume one with regard to judgments dating from 1968 to 1992, while a second one was to follow, dealing with cases from 1992 to 2006) .

In our current environment, it would not be odd to remind the fact that the internet was not yet known and widely used as now. For legal practitioners, based in Mauritius or elsewhere, the issue was then whether a proper access could be guaranteed to the case-law of the Board. In addition to this, reports then available in the Anglo-Saxon world may not always publish those judgments. To look for them was therefore not an easy matter, especially if one is from a remote location.

A real and specific need was, in our minds, to be cared for. It was this precise need, however prosaic it may look, that moved us to undertake this work. We had of course to contemplate editorial tasks, in addition to being physically present within the premises in Downing Street. We thus penetrated into the world of the old archives of the Privy Council in view to extracting what would be of interest to the legal world of today. It was clear that such archives could never fail to reveal the thickness of time that they have witnessed which in turn pervaded the atmosphere with a historical thickness of the institution. Secondly, it was necessary to see to the typographical transcriptions towards their publications, which culminated in a first printing of the MPCR in 1999.

With the advent of the world-wide use of the internet, the Privy Council saw the need to publish its judgments on-line. Consequently, our work ought to have become an accessory were it not for two major reasons that would not allow for such a view, as we see it.

First, some of the judgments edited by us are probably not otherwise available. They may have been previously seen as too old or as not bearing any relevance to the common law world-wide. As far as we were concerned, such an approach could not limit our selection and we have thus retained some « Mauritian » judgments that may not have been published in any report. Their relevance would always be potential for the Mauritian Legal system or for such other one that would have to deal with similar legal circumstances thus legitimating the importance we attributed to them in the first place.

Secondly, some leading cases, as according to the common law tradition, bear our introductory editorial lines in the form of « keywords » and « abstracts » in relation to the legal issues and argumentation. These tools are for practitioners of an immense help and allow for a methodological management of case-law research that no software may replace in so far as the human element is primordial to the practice of law.

It is in that spirit that we are pleased to offer to the legal community, of Mauritius, of the Commonwealth and of the European world, and indeed, to any lawyer having an interest in this rare forum which is now the Privy Council, a fundamental tool towards the elaboration of law in our courts. If the authority of a judgment is not always binding, it remains most of the time persuasive.

May we express here our wish for « Justice » as a derridean concept, such a one that calls for a world that should always be on-coming but which can never be reached in a definitive state in History. This, after all, is what a case-law would stand for ultimately. What ought to come can never relieve us from our struggle, over and over again, for the idea of Justice that we carry, the sense of Law that haunted the minds of those well before Hammurabi had erected his stone-code. We would only hope, in the end, to contribute, be it all too modestly, towards building the juridical consciousness of tomorrow’s world, such a consciousness that is of our heritage and which has cemented our societies.

The editors.

(R. Dookhy & P. Dookhy)

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AVANT-PROPOS DE LA VERSION ELECTRONIQUE

À l’ère où la version électronique du «Recueil de jurisprudence mauricienne du Comité Judiciaire du Conseil Privé» - (le « Mauritius Privy Council Reports » qu’il convient d’abréger en MPCR) - a vu le jour, il nous importe de rappeler l’intention qui avait présidé à sa publication.

L’ouvrage, conçu initialement en version imprimée et reliée, avait été entrepris dans les années 1996 à Londres. Un premier volume en paraissait en 1999 (volume 1 traitant les jurisprudences de 1968 à 1992 qui devait être suivi par un second traitant celles de 1992 à 2006).

Faut-il le rappeler, l’internet n’était pas encore un outil connu et répandu en cette décennie-là. Pour les juristes et les professionnels du droit, mauriciens ou non, la question se posait réellement s’ils pouvaient s’assurer d’un accès libre à la jurisprudence du Conseil. Or, les recueils de droit couramment utilisés dans le monde anglo-saxon ne publiaient pas toujours cette jurisprudence. La chercher ne constituait donc pas une démarche aisée et évidente.

Une nécessité impérieuse se faisait hélas reconnaître avec un besoin précis. C’était bien celle-ci, fût-elle prosaïque, qui nous poussa alors à entreprendre ce travail. S’il fallait bien envisager un travail de sélection et de composition, aussi fallait-il se rendre sur place au Downing Street. C’est ainsi que nous étions amenés à pénétrer l’univers des anciennes archives du Conseil Privé pour n’en retenir que celles qui nous intéressaient. Il était évident que les archives témoignaient bien de l’épaisseur du temps qui ne manquait d’imprégner l’atmosphère d'une épaisseur historique de l’institution. Dans un deuxième temps, il importait de veiller à sa transcription typographique aux fins de publication, qui aboutissait donc avec une première publication du « MPCR » en 1999.

Or, il s’avère qu’avec l’utilisation répandue de l’internet, le Conseil Privé s’était vu lui-même dans l’obligation de publier sa jurisprudence en ligne. Par conséquent, notre travail aurait pu devenir accessoire. Pour autant, deux raisons militaient à l’encontre d'une telle vision.

Premièrement, certaines des jurisprudences éditées par nos soins ne sont peut-être pas disponibles ailleurs. Elles ont été sans doute jugées, précédemment, comme trop anciennes ou n’ayant pas de pertinence sensible pour le droit common law dans sa globalité. Or, de telles considérations ne pouvaient nous limiter dans nos choix et nous faisons état des jurisprudences « mauriciennes » qui peut-être n'ont jamais fait l'objet de publication dans un recueil de jurisprudence. La pertinence demeure toujours potentielle pour le droit mauricien ou pour telle autre juridiction qui se trouverait devant une situation juridique similaire qui justifiait ainsi de l’importance que nous lui aurons accordée.

Deuxièmement, certains des grands arrêts sont, comme c'est le cas dans la tradition jurisprudentielle common law, encadrés par nos soins de mots clés (« keywords ») et des périphrases qui font office de résumé (« abstract ») de l’argumentation et de la problématique juridiques. Ces deux outils sont pour les praticiens d’un atout considérable et permettent une gestion méthodologique dans la recherche jurisprudentielle, que nul logiciel ne pourra peut-être remplacer, pour peu que l’élément humain conserve son empreinte dans l’exercice du droit.

C'est en ce sens donc que nous sommes ravis d’offrir à la communauté juridique, de Maurice, du monde Commonwealth et européen, voire à tout juriste s’intéressant à cette juridiction particulière qu'est le Conseil Privé, un outil de prime importance pour l’élaboration du droit dans nos tribunaux. Si la jurisprudence n'est pas toujours contraignante (« binding »), selon l’espèce en question, elle demeure souvent persuasive (« persuasive »).

Qu’il nous soit permis ainsi d’exprimer nos vœux d’un acheminement de la Justice comme un règne derridien. C'est alors celui qui ne cesse de venir mais sans jamais s’accomplir définitivement dans l’Histoire. En ce sens, il ne s’agirait ici, après tout, que d'une définition même de la jurisprudence. Ce qui doit toujours venir ne dispense aucunement nos juristes à baisser les bras pour chercher encore, et de nouveau, le sens de la Justice qui nous incarne, le sens du droit qui hantait les esprits bien avant qu’Hammourabi ne dressa son code. C'est ainsi que nous souhaitons que nos efforts tendent, modestement et à leurs façons, du moins osons-nous l’espérer ainsi, à porter la conscience juridique du monde pour la société de demain, celle dont nous avons héritée et qui fut le ciment de nos sociétés.

Les éditeurs.

(R. Dookhy et P. Dookhy)

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Printed version/ version imprimée : The Priviy Council Reports, Recueil de jurisprudence, Le Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté la Reine d’Angleterre, Selection and Key terms, The MPCR, Volume 1 (1968-1992 judgments), edited by, édité par, Riyad DOOKHY and/et Parvèz DOOKHY, The Thames Chambers International, London/Londres, 1999.

THE 1999 EDITION : INTRODUCTION and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS/SOMMAIRE

Introduction (en français/in French)

Introduction (First edition, 1999) (en anglais/in English)

Acknowledgements (First edition, 1999)

(Reproduction from the printed version/ reproduit de la version imprimée)

…^[1]

INTRODUCTION

La constitution d'un recueil de jurisprudence nous paraît répondre d’emblée à un défi contre la finitude d'une décision de justice historiquement ancrée. En effet, elle se présente volontiers comme une lutte contre le temps et l’espace, voire contre les murs d'un prétoire qui n’auront pas permis que ses paroles soient entendues ailleurs, sauf dans des effets « inter partes » immédiats.

S’agissant du Conseil Privé, au regard de l’ordre juridique mauricien, un recueil s’inscrirait dans cette perspective comme une lutte contre les mers qui diviseraient une compétence unifiée d’un ordre que nous pouvons qualifier de « trans-sytémique ». C'est la raison pour laquelle certains juristes du passé n’ont eu aucun mal à qualifier la constitution d'un recueil comme une inscription des oracles sur les ardoises juridiques de la mémoire^[2], ce dernier mot étant ce qui retiendrait ici notre attention. Notons qu’en common law, il s’agit de « law reporting », c'est-à-dire d’un « rapport » sans médiateté du « Droit ». Bien entendu, ce vocabulaire reflète la position éminente et fondamentale qu’occupe la jurisprudence d'un droit dit, à juste titre, « jurisprudentiel ».

Ce qui sous-tend la notion d'un recueil de jurisprudence est avant tout une conception qui s’érige à l’encontre même de la finitude, mais tout en reconnaissant le fait qu’une réponse fut élaborée à un moment précis de l'histoire. Il comporte aujourd'hui, dans la plupart des systèmes juridiques, l’idée d’autorité. Si la « mémoire » vaut pour une épaisseur diachronique du « rapport », il n’en est pas moins question d'une synchronicité structuraliste dans la mesure où ce qui pourrait à première vue apparaître comme secondaire (selon un certain positivisme ambiant) ne peut que se montrer au centre même de l’articulation d'un système^[3].

I. La structure du présent

C'est à bon droit qu’il faut voir, selon nous, que la logique sous-jacente d'un recueil est qu’elle réfléchit la structure de la mémoire. Une expérience juridique rapportée pourrait ainsi être vue comme un miroir à travers lequel les juristes puisent dans la rhétorique et la déclamation dont témoigne l’écrit, qui permet alors une ouverture sur l’immémorial. C'est le langage (plus que la langue) comme positivité, qui est lié au temps abstrait. Seul le langage fait office du « rappelable »^[4], et de façon plus importante, seul lui fait office de mémoire pour nous. C'est lui seulement qui nous permet de participer dans un acte de connaissance à travers l’épaisseur du passé. Cette épaisseur est composée de traditions, d’empiricités et de discours qui auront structuré notre mémoire juridique du présent. Le langage est alors une voie vers le passé^[5] de l’humanité comme elle est une voie vers sa rationalité et vers son idée de justice. Il n'est pas, en effet, surprenant de constater qu’en droit anglais médiéval (dit « Law French », Droit anglo-saxon franco-normand) et en latin, alors que l’oralité était synonyme de mémoire, il n'y avait pas de distinction entre ‘mémoire’ et ‘esprit’ (‘memory’ et ‘mind’)^[6].

Il n’en demeure pas moins vrai qu’il nous appartient ici de souligner que c'est bien la dimension du passé d'un recueil qui le contraint paradoxalement à faire partie d'un processus continuel au présent. Il est question d'un processus dès lors qu’il s’agit d'une voie infinie à la construction de nos approches au sujet du « réel » (ou de « l’effectivité »). C'est aussi une partie de notre manière de faire l'histoire juridique de notre passé, qui s’inscrit dans la construction de notre réalité. Certains ont essayé de décrire ce processus comme impliquant la participation de tout juriste et de tout juge individuellement, chacun écrivant à sa manière une partie d’un livre^[7] de l'humanité. Néanmoins, cette dernière description ne prend malheureusement pas en compte les discontinuités foucaldiennes dans la façon d’écrire le narratif de nos différentes histoires. Mais c'est bien ces tensions qui témoignent alors de la « contemporanéité » de notre présent qui se distingue ainsi de « l’histoire » d’un passé.

C'est en sens, qu'il nous faudra faire état d'un deuxième paradoxe. La constitution d'un recueil, du point de vue de la mémoire et de celui qui considère la mémoire comme le sol ‘structurant’ de notre présent, se révèle plus particulièrement comme la « trace » de la lutte de l'homme d’établir des passerelles au-dessus des changements. Il comporte une phobie, à juste titre. C'est celle de la perte de la mémoire^[8]. Toutefois, si nous avons fait état de la mémoire comme une totalité métaphysique, précisons cependant notre pensée. La mémoire, pour nous, ne peut être elle-même « mémorable ». Elle ne peut être, après la chute de la présence, qu’une formulation de ce que le passé « aurait du » être, mais dont le mystère subsiste, tant la « terre » du passé ne nous est plus accessible. Telle est une position paradoxale, mais qui ne peut, comme on le verra, être qu’éminemment fructueuse. Telle est notre position dans l’instance que nous adoptons ici en tant que « rapporteurs » de la mémoire.

II. Traditions romano-germanique et common law

La tradition d'un recueil de jurisprudence a tant marqué le système français que britannique, c'est-à-dire en dernier lieu, le système mauricien. On pourra y voir une évolution dans sa forme moderne de la tradition romaine des « jurisprudents »^[9]. Certes, c'est bien dans le monde moderne qu’une telle activité fut formellement énoncée, comme la première Loi du 10 décembre 1790 en France. Dans le monde common law, une réglementation formelle était, bien entendu, hésitante, tant elle forme, selon nous, une conscience réflexive du Geist auto-révélant de celle-ci, si tant est-il qu’il nous soit nécessaire de faire référence à la marche de l’Histoire hégélienne. La pratique romaine ne peut donc être niée dans la facture des nos recueils, que ceux-ci ont pris le nom, à travers les siècles, de « Rotuli curia regis », de « State Trials » ou de « Recueil ».

Dans le passé, les recueils étaient souvent constitués par des rapporteurs qui entreprenaient une telle activité pour leur propre compte^[10], d’habitude puisant des notes qu’ils prenaient pendant qu’ils étaient présents à une audience. Parfois, ces recueils comportaient de graves erreurs et inexactitudes^[11]. Pour autant, n'est-ce pas ici ce qui doit témoigner, selon nous, de l’impossibilité même de la métaphysique de la mémoire ?

III. La constitution des recueils en droit mauricien

Si le premier recueil du Conseil Privé était établi par Edmund Moore dès 1840, notre but ici est de faire état d'un premier recueil qui prend en compte les décisions du Conseil Privé faisant partie du système mauricien, tout en gardant à l’esprit notre position quant à l’« immémorabilité » de la mémoire même. Ce recueil doit alors prendre en compte la spécificité mauricienne dans l’établissement des lignes éditoriales, mots clés (« keywords ») et résumés (« abstracts ») qui ressortent d'une telle pratique « trans-systémique ».

A Maurice, le « Code des Isles de France et de Bourbon » sous la plume de M. Delaleu, connu comme « Code Delaleu », et même si celui portait le nom de « Code », rapportait les diverses « ordonnances » de Louis XIV, Roi de France. Le Code régissait pendant longtemps le Conseil Supérieur de l’Isle de France.

Pendant le règne britannique de Maurice qui s’ensuivit, à partir du 3 novembre 1810, la première publication des décisions judiciaires était entreprise par Maître Raymond Bruzaud, Avocat, intitulé « Revue Judiciaire ». Une première publication était lancée en juin 1843^[12]. Malheureusement cette première entreprise cessa après trois ans^[13]. Plus tard, il devait publier dans un volume séparé les décisions datant de 1842 à 1845^[14]. Il publia une autre compilation en 1845 sous le titre de « Recueil des décisions judiciaires de l’île Maurice, - Reports of cases argued and determined before the Courts of the Island of Mauritius in 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845 »^[15]. À partir de 1861, bien d’autres éditeurs ont publié le « Mauritius Law Reports ». Seuls quelques autres publications ponctuelles ont aussi été imprimées^[16].

Dans les dernières décennies, on a vu un nombre croissant des pourvois devant le Conseil Privé, qui statue ainsi en dernière instance dans l’ordre juridique mauricien^[17]. Ses décisions ont donc épousé les contours du droit mauricien, répondant et structurant en ses propres mots les nouvelles interrogations sociales et juridiques. Par conséquent, il nous faut faire état d'une cour de cassation^[18], au regard de sa pratique, même si les Lords du Conseil Privé récusent^[19] eux-mêmes une telle qualification. Les décisions du Conseil, référées par un des Lords comme « jurisprudence » selon une acception française^[20], ne peuvent donc être surestimées.

L’Aufklarung a voulu croire dans la réalisation du mythe de Prométhée qui avait pu voler le feu des Dieux pour le donner^[21], - ou peut-être pour le redonner – à l’humanité. Son esprit vise à une réinvention de l'humain, ou alors vise à ce que l’Homme quitte le royaume des Cieux pour fouler le sol de l’immanence. Le besoin d'une autonomie fut alors « découvert », comme truisme de la Raison^[22]. Or un même esprit doit nous saisir en parlant d'un recueil de jurisprudence. En ce sens, l’idée de tradition et de la métaphysique de la mémoire comporte une double face. Alors que la tradition lie le juriste, elle est aussi la brisure qui fait intervenir le progrès. C'est donc en recréant ce théâtre du monde des élites des Lumières que le droit mauricien renouera pleinement avec l’Histoire.

R. Dookhy et P. Dookhy

Londres, juillet 1998.

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Notes de bas de pages (v. fin Introduction de l’édition de 1999)

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…^[1]

INTRODUCTION (1999 edition)

Law reporting is, for us, primarily and before anything else, a defiance against the finitude of the locality of a judgment within a temporal frame. It may take the form of a fight against time and space or against the walls of a hearing room, which would not have otherwise carried its words beyond, apart from any immediate ‘inter partes’ legal effect. It is, with regard to Privy Council Judgments for the Mauritian Legal Order, a fight against the seas that divide the jurisdictional unity of what can be seen as a « trans-systemic » legal order. It is not surprising therefore that some lawyers in the past had described law reporting as an inscribing of oracles on legal slates of memory^[2], the latter term “memory” weighing heavily in our case.

What underlies the notion of law reporting is intrinsically a conception against finitude, whilst acknowledging thereby the fact that an answer was elaborated at a specific point in time. It carries with it today, in most legal systems, the idea of legal authority. If “memory” bespeaks of a diachronic thickness of a judgment, a synchronic structuralist viewpoint would have no difficulty in seeing that what could at first appear as secondary is in fact abysmally entrenched in a legal system^[3].

I. The structure of the present

The underpinning logic of a report is that it mirrors the structure of memory. A reported legal experience can be seen as a mirror whereby lawyers may tap into a rhetoric and an advocacy of the report, which in fact is an insight into the immemorial. For here, it is language, as positivity, which is linked with abstract time. Only language may allow us to « remember »^[4] and, more importantly, which remembers for us. It alone allows us to participate in an act of cognition through the thickness of the past. This thickness is made of traditions, of empiricities, of discourses that had structured our legal memory. It is a way to humanity’s past^[5] as it is a way to his rationality and to his idea of law. It would not be surprising to learn that in Law French and Latin, when orality was quite synonymous with memory, there was no distinction between “memory” and “mind”^[6].

The past dimension of a law report is what, paradoxically, compels it to become part of an ongoing process. This process outlines our different approaches to what can be termed « reality » (or « le réel », but more precisely, « l’effectivité »), and as such is part of our history. It is also part of how we do make legal history from our past. Some have tempted to describe this process as one in which every lawyer and every judge is individually adding his or her contribution, as a book which is currently being written by humanity^[7]. But the latter description does not account for Foucauldian discontinuities in the making of the narratives of our different histories.

Law reporting bears thus, from the standpoint of memory, and from that which considered memory the ‘structuring’ ground of the present, the mark (should we mention the concept here of “trace” ?) of humanity's struggle to establish continuity in change. It carries with it a phobia, that, understandably, of a possible loss of memory itself^[8]. If we have referred to memory as a metaphysical totality, let us say briefly here, that in the end, memory itself fails to be “memorable”, and must become only a present formulation of what the past “ought” to have been, but which itself may not be reached.

II. Romano-germanic and common law traditions

Law reporting has marked both the French and the English legal system, and therefore the Mauritian one. One can witness here a continuation of what could be traced back, as a developed form, to the Roman Tradition of the « Jurisprudents »^[9]. It is, notwithstanding, in the modern world that such an activity was statutorily formulated, as for instance, the first ‘Loi’ of 10 December 1790 in France. It remains for most of the time slightly regulated in the common law world, as it forms a reflexive self-consciousness to the Self-revealing Geist of the latter, were we here to refer a Hegelian march in History. Undeniably, however, Roman practices played an important role in the shaping of our contemporary reports, whether they bore the name, throughout the various histories that have marked our destiny, of « Rotuli curia regis », of « States Trials », or, for that matter, of “Recueil”.

Reports were usually compiled by rapporteurs who undertook such an activity for their personal or professional use[10] perhaps from the notes they took while they were present at court. At times, they consisted in severe irregularities and errors^[11]. But is that not the mark then, of the impossibility of the metaphysics of memory ?

III. Law Reporting in Mauritius

The first Privy Council reports were compiled by Edmund Moore as early as 1840. We wish to introduce here a first Report, bearing in mind what has been said, which aim to incorporate specifically Judgments from the Privy Council as part of the Mauritian system, with specific demands in relation to “keywords” and “abstracts” as can be felt within such a “trans-systemic” practice.

In Mauritius, the « Code des Isles de France et de Bourbon » by M. Delaleu, known as « Code Delaleu », although bearing the title of a « code », referred to various « ordonnances » of the King of France, Louis XIVth. The Code « governed » for long the « Conseil Supérieur de l’Isle de France ».

During the British rule of Mauritius, which dates from 3 November 1810, the first publication of judicial decisions was undertaken by Maître Raymond Bruzaud, Avocat, entitled « Revue Judiciaire ». An initial publication was issued in June 1843^[12]. Unfortunately Maître Bruzaud’s entreprise were to pass away in its infancy, some three years after its inception^[13]. Subsequently, he reprinted in a separate volume the Reports of cases decided from 1842 to 1845^[14]. He published a second compilation in 1845 under the title of « Recueil des décisions judiciaires de l'Ile Maurice - Reports of cases argued and determined before the Courts of the Island of Mauritius in 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845 »^[15]. From 1861 various other publishers undertook to publish the « Mauritius Law Reports ». Only few other sporadic publications were also produced^[16].

In the past decade, there has been an increasing number of appeals brought to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the final Court of Appeal for Mauritius^[17], so that its judgments now espouse the contours of the evolution of the law in Mauritius, responding to and framing in its words new legal and social interrogations. Inevitably, it now amounts to a cassation court with regard to its practices^[18], despite the refutation from, and no less than, the Privy Councillors themselves that such is not their role^[19].The judgments – referred to by one of the Lords in anglicised French usage « jurisprudence »^[20] - of the Privy Council then cannot be over-emphasized.

Enlightenment had wished to believe in the incarnation of the myth of Prometheus who stole fire from the Gods to bestow it - or to probably restore it - to mankind^[21]. Its spirit aims at a reinvention of mankind itself, or at mankind leaving the realms of heaven to tread an unfolding immanent world. The need for autonomy was somehow “discovered”, as a truism of reason^[22]. The same spirit should govern the idea of a law report. In that context, the idea of tradition and the metaphysics of memory are therefore two-sided. Whilst traditions bind the jurist, they are the key to progress, were it to entail in the demotion of the former. Only in recreating the théâtre on which the élite of the enlightenment had wished to perform can Mauritius renew its ties with History.

R. Dookhy and P. Dookhy,

London, July 1998

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Footnotes (Introduction, 1999 edition)

[1] “Sire, par la resone ke la oure qant ce fut, sy fut le Roy Henri, ke dunke fut, en prison: e ... le chef de leis fut en prisone, sy fut la ley en prisone, issi ke a cel oure qant le fet &c. ne aveit yl nule ley: par quey le fet et le feffement est nul en sei.”

« Sir, for the reason that at the time when this deed was made, King Henry [III] was in prison: and inasmuch as the governor and the head of Law was in prison, the law itself was in prison: so that at that time when the deed was made there was no law: therefore the deed and the feoffment is void in itself », in POLLOCK, Sir Frederick, Right Honorable, Bart., K.C, D.C.L, A first book of Jurisprudence, 6th edition, Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1929, v. p. 299.

[2] This is what otherwise can be termed as « Blackstone’s Oracles of Judges ». As for the publication of Blackstone`s commentaries, see BLACKSTONE, Sir William, The Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th edition, John Murray, Albemarle St, 1876.

Adde : BOORSTIN Daniel J., The Mysterious Science of the Law, An Essay on Blackstone`s Commentaries, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, originally published in 1941, republished in 1996.

[3] TIMSIT Gérard, Thèmes et systèmes de droit, Les voies du droit, Presses Universitaires de France, 1986 ; RAZ Joseph, The Concept of a legal system, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970 and 1980.

[4] GOODRICH Peter, Languages of Law, From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1990.

[5] LE GOFF, Jacques, Histoire et mémoire, Collection Folio, Histoire, éditions Gallimard (1986) 1988, pp. 406.

[6] BAKER, J. H., The legal profession and the Common Law, Historical Essays, The Hambledon Press, London 1986, v. p. 161, and also footnote 29.

[7] MORRISON Wayne, Jurisprudence from the Greeks to post-modernism, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London 1997, v. p. 9 and 10.

[8] Cf. Blackstone’s, op.cit., : "the solemnity of our legal phrase... time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" and Edward Coke’s definition of law reports: "a bringing againe to memory cases judicially argued".

Adde : ABBOTT, L. W., Law Reporting in England 1485-1585, Univesity of London, The Athlone Press, London 1973, v. p. 1 ; SIMPSON A. W. B., « The Common Law and Legal Theory », in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, edited by SIMPSON A. W. B., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, v. p. 93 ; FRAUNCE, A. Lawiers Logike, 1588, London.

[9] VILLEY Michel, Le droit romain, Presses Universitaires de France, Que sais-je, Paris, 1945, v. p. 36.

[10] POLLOCK, Sir Frederick, Right Honorable, Bart., K.C, D.C.L, A first book of Jurisprudence, op. cit., v. p. 294.

[11] BEAUCHAMP, J., J., LLD, CR., Répertoire Général de Jurisprudence Canadienne, 1770-1913, Wison & Lafleur Limitée, Montréal, numéro 1.

[12] NAIRAC G. E.. K.C., « Foreword », in Digest of the Mauritius Law Reports, unpaginated, P. G. Bumstead, Governement Printer, Port-Louis, 1927.

[13] The Chief Justice, « Foreword » in Mauritius Law Review, Revue de Droit et de Jurisprudence Mauricienne, unpaginated, Rue Jules Koenig, Port-Louis, 1977-1980.

[14] GREENE, W., Crown Solicitor, « Preface », in Digest of the Reported Criminal Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Mauritius, from 1842 to 1883, unpaginated, but consisting of 158 judgments, Port-Louis 1884.

[15] NAIRAC G. E. K.C., Digest of the Mauritius Law Reports, op. cit.

[16] Note the words of Lalouette which can carry trans-historical relevancy in our context : "For some time the need has been felt by the members of the legal profession for a Digest of Decisions ...", (LALOUETTE, G., « Foreword », in A Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Mauritius, published by J. Eliel Felix, Acting Government Printer, Port-Louis, 1947), which can at some point in time express the growing feeling in the Mauritian legal system.

[17] See Section 81 of the Mauritius Constitution.

[18] It is undeniable that the Privy Council is a Cassation Court like the French Cassation Court. See DOOKHY Parvèz, Le Comité Judiciaire du Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté la Reine Elisabeth II d'Angleterre et le Droit Mauricien, PHD thesis, University of Sorbonne, Paris, 1997. « A la manière de la Cour de Cassation française, le Comité Judiciaire veille exclusivement au respect de la norme, à sa bonne application par le juge local. Sa mission se limite au jugement des arrêts déférés à sa censure même lorsqu'il est saisi directement en cassation par la procédure de la voie d'action en vertu d'une requête tendant à l'annulation d'une Loi. Juge suprême, il fixe l'orthodoxie de la jurisprudence et veille à son respect par la Cour Suprême locale », ibid, v. p. 92.

[19] See judgment number 04 infra, Chooramun Jhoboo v Elias Ibrahim Coowar, (1977-1987) I MCPR 51.

[20] Cf. The term « jurisprudence », in Ponsamy Poongavanam v. The Queen, see Vol II, Mauritius Privy Council Reports, to be published.

[21] SALOMON Jean-Jacques, Le destin technologique, Balland, Paris, 1992, v. p. 17.

[22] FURET François, « Préface » in DUPRONT Alphonse, Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?, Editions Gallimard, 1996, Paris, v. p. II.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS – REMERCIEMENTS (1999 edition)

We would like to express our thanks to Mr. David H. O. Owen, Registrar of the Privy Council, who has kindly introduced us to the various archives and provided us with the necessary documentation. Our thanks go similarly in that regard to the staff of the Privy Council.

We must mention here Professor Gérard Conac of the University of Panthéon-Sorbonne who has in the first place drawn our attention to the constitutional authority of the Privy Council. We must also express our debt to all those who have assisted us in this task, too many to be individually named.

We hope we have prejudiced none in having here cited but a few.

London, March 1999.

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The Mauritius Privy Council Reports

Friday, 19 August 1988

Sattar Buxoo v The Queen

EDITORS AND REPORTERS - EDITEURS ET RAPPORTEURS

DECISIONS OF THE BOARD - LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CONSEIL PRIVE

FOREWORD and/et AVANT-PROPOS

THE 1999 EDITION : INTRODUCTION and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Judicial Committee

The Judicial Committee sitting in Mauritius

The Mauritius Privy Council Reports